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UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001840

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ISTANBUL CENTRAL ASIA TECHNICAL WORKSHOP
TO PREVENT THE ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS

1. The goal of the workshop was to build a partnership between technical advisors and export control agencies on a regional level. The objectives were to find regional common ground against smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and propose projects to support the primary goal.

2. Regional Cooperation: It was recognized that some borders will not need radiation monitors depending on what their neighboring country has installed. The effectiveness of radiation monitoring depends on the regional "protective net" established within several countries not just on one countries ability to protect its border. Combined training and equipping with common type equipment will save money and be more effective. Regional cooperation is extremely important in identifying potential sources and users (information sharing). Central Asia is seen as the transit ground; drugs north and WMD south.

3. Conference Conclusion: The conference wrap-up was scheduled for two hours with the goal being the production of a single document, signed by all parties, agreeing on steps needed to get to the next level. Unfortunately, this was not as simple a task as it seemed. The group, which agreed on several issues during discussion, could not agree on very much when it came to a written agreement (what a surprise). The Turkmen agreed to publish the results of the conference but not the names of who attended (this took 20 minutes). All participants expressed an interest in expansion of cooperation in the area of radiation monitoring but argued for 45 minutes on terminology (the difference between a control and a monitor). All had earlier agreed on information sharing but all balked at the creation of a website which would contain unclassified information on systems and procedures. The Turkmen and the Kazakhs said the website would be an information center for terrorists to learn how to defeat their systems. All countries gave several examples on how they share intelligence to combat illicit narcotics trafficking, but none were willing to share technology and tactics to defeat proliferation of WMD. Some things they did all agree on were the use of a "risk based approach to prioritize efforts and the development of mobile response teams". (COMMENT: It was very interesting to see members from all the Central Asian countries together in one room addressing a common problem. There were some very strong personalities, a strong sense of country pride, some minor barbs thrown at the other countries, but in the end, some consensus was reached. Regional cooperation is possible on certain issues; however we have a long way to go to find true regional cooperation. END COMMENT.)

4. CURRENT STATUS REPORTS BY COUNTRY:

(A) Uzbekistan: Viewed as a transit country with established and developed major transit routes. Their top priority is to control and eliminate the smuggling of drugs and WMD materials. The Uzbeks consider themselves a leader in Central Asia when it comes to installation of portal monitoring equipment (85 per cent funded by U.S. dollars) but also realize that it is impossible to install monitors at all potential border crossing points. They see the need for a joint initiative and regional cooperation and view smuggling of WMD as a serious issue. They currently have 11 monitors in place with eight more by 2006, 11 more by 2007, for a proposed total of 100 by projects end. They have established a centralized information and dispatch center staffed by both customs and radioactive material technical experts. They regulate movement of WMD in accordance with several international regimes which includes monitoring the internal movement of "legal" radioactive materials. Their military doctrine prohibits the production and possession of WMD. Uzbekistan is looking for new approaches to solve smuggling of WMD that would also compliment efforts to combat illicit narcotics trafficking. They have designed their own monitors using a new approach (Z detectors shielded from each

other) which are still in the infant stage but have produced peak data points. They feel that continuous, explicit training is required for customs and border guard units and proposed a three level training plan. Level one is basic training for

customs and border guards, level two is supervisory training, and level three integrates university level training for customs candidates.

(B) Kazakhstan: The Kazakh strategy for combating WMD trafficking is a strong customs control. They currently have 167 legal border crossing points, controlled by 16 regional customs offices, which they consider a comprehensive customs system. They have enacted several new laws on radioactive materials control, most of which were driven by WMD agreements signed by the government. They claim to comply with all international standards and that their laws are written using international regime control lists. Several controls of varying degrees are in place throughout the country. Aspect monitors (Russian design) are used at the primary crossing points (major road, rail, and airports) with portable monitors used at minor ports and "green border" areas. Portable monitors consist of ionizers, spectrometers, and radiation pagers. All data collected is first evaluated by customs then sent to the "experts" for review if deemed necessary by customs. Customs also has "mobile labs" which they can dispatch to any area reporting an anomaly. The Kazakh's also agree that information must be shared in order to effectively combat illicit trafficking of WMD. They currently cooperate with neighboring countries and the Russian Federation. They have a system in place to get all collected information to one control server. Most of the Kazakh effort with respect to WMD trafficking is financed by Kazakhstan, with only approximately 10 percent financed by the U.S. (a fact they are very proud of). They currently have a 10-hour training course in place which follows a step by step process from introduction and identification to advanced operation of monitoring equipment. Supervisors are offered advanced courses in "new developments".

(C) Kyrgyzstan: The Kyrgyz were very involved with the former Soviet Union Nuclear program with regard to mining of radioactive materials. All of the mines with the exception of Karabela have been closed leaving piles and tailings that pose a radioactive hazard and need to be cleaned up. In 1999 Kyrgyzstan began revising laws on the regulation of radioactive materials, which involved several agencies. From these revisions a list of controlled products was compiled and enacted; which has resulted in several vehicles traveling from China being turned back at the border. In 2003 IAEA spearheaded a joint seminar that produced an agreement that included equipment donations to Kyrgyz Customs. There are several EXBS technical programs ongoing, including capacity building projects providing communications, transportation, inspection/detection equipment, and computer support. The Kyrgyz enjoy a close relationship with the U.S. Department of State and wish to continue and build on that relationship. Portal monitors are currently being installed at some ports with the help of the EXBS program. In March of 2005, Second Line of Defense (SLD) had a meeting that included the Department of Energy, Department of Defense and the Kyrgyz Government. As a result of this meeting the Kyrgyz Government is currently working on a WMD agreement that should be completed and signed soon. The Kyrgyz delegation sees information sharing as a very important step in combating WMD trafficking and supports regional cooperation. They also agree that regional training events and exercises would be very beneficial.

(D) Tajikistan: The Tajik delegate started by saying, "Tajikistan agreed that Uzbekistan was a good place to start a pilot program on radiation monitoring because it helped to strengthen the Tajik border as well, forming a 'shield' for the Tajik border with Uzbekistan". He went on to say that "we should concentrate on securing the outer borders of Central

Asia; this would be cheaper and at the same time provide the desired results". (COMMENT: The Uzbek delegation was surprised at this proposal since it would result in no need for monitoring on their borders and they consider themselves the leader in Central Asia when it comes to radiation monitoring. END COMMENT) Tajikistan has recently revised laws on dual use, narcotics, and radioactive materials but they are still in the implementation stage. The law states that customs has the lead on radioactive materials import and export however the Academy of Sciences has the lead on radioactive materials in country. Tajikistan feels there is a need to unite regional efforts in the areas of export control and dual use legislation. They see a need for a regional advisory center to coordinate efforts throughout Central Asia to include training and equipping with common types of detection. Tajikistan admits that several areas of their border are very transparent and detection capability is limited. They request help on the Afghan and Chinese borders but feel the current efforts of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan adequately protect their common borders. Due to limited infrastructure there are really no established major routes as there are in other CA countries. Tajikistan currently deploys radiation pagers for detection of radioactive materials and feels that installation of permanent portal monitors, while effective, would be a hit and miss proposition at best (due to terrain and infrastructure constraints).

(E) Turkmenistan: Turkmenistan is no different than the other

CIS countries; it has signed the WMD agreement and will not facilitate the production of any new weapons. It pays attention to all international standards and cooperate with the IAEA with respect to signed agreements on the regulation of nuclear materials. Turkmen laws have four provisions with respect to WMD; 1.) Support combating of proliferation of WMD, 2.) Combat illicit trafficking of any material that causes international hazards and support all international efforts, 3.) Deny over-flight of aircraft carrying WMD components (PSI agreement), 4.) Support additional steps on implementation of nonproliferation efforts. As of April of 2005 all major border crossings have radioactive material monitoring devices in place, this includes five crossing points with Iran, one with Afghanistan, one with Uzbekistan, and one Caspian seaport. The Turkmen delegate stated, "You can all sleep well at night because our borders are locked down tight". In 2006 they will be opening a new "state of the art" border crossing and deploying a mobile X-ray van. (COMMENT: All radiation monitoring projects in Turkmenistan are 100 percent funded by the U.S., a fact the Turkmen delegate seemed very proud of. END COMMENT) Turkmenistan sees the value in regional information sharing but on a limited basis within the customs community only.

15. U.S. PRESENTATIONS:

(A) Dr. Ken Sale, Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, gave a presentation on the U.S. perspective of WMD enforcement on U.S. borders. He stated the strategy was to have "smarter borders" which involves pushing borders outward and relying on international cooperation. The highest payoff in border management is not in the equipment, it's in the people coordinating and cooperating with each other. Radioactive materials, some of which are legal, are small and easily shielded from monitors. For this reason the United States needs more technical cooperation to help detect methods of transportation and end users. It is imperative that all personnel involved have a complete understanding of detection systems and their limitations. The focus is changing to detection and training that must be comprehensive and compatible. There are several new detection devices being developed and deployed, to include the "ARAM system", a portable system being used by the California Highway Patrol that has produced positive results. The United States needs to cooperate locally and internationally as a team in order to combat the

threat of WMD, which potentially threatens all countries.

(B) Major Chip Parker, CENTCOM J5 Disaster Preparedness, gave a CENTCOM Strategy briefing which proposed a Regional Disaster Preparedness Center for Central Asia. This concept was first introduced by CENTCOM in Africa which now has 11 nations participating. It is not a U.S. centric program; it relies on regional cooperation in order to work. CENTCOM considers Central Asia a very strategically important region and feels there is a willingness within the individual states to cooperate with each other. The proposed center would promote information sharing on experiences and best practices as well as facilitate regional training in legal, response, and equipment aspects. CENTCOM will be visiting all the CA countries in the next couple of months to discuss this concept with the respective ministries.

16. WORKING GROUP TOPICS AND RESULTS:

The delegates were separated into two working groups for the morning session, then shuffled and formed two new working groups for the afternoon session.

(A) Group I - Portal Monitors. This group evaluated the current status of the portal monitors currently being used and made recommendations on further procurement. The consensus of the group was that there are several different types in use and all have pluses and minuses. The need to integrate technical experts into the detection process was split, some feel the customs personnel can evaluate the data and don't need technical experts unless asked for, others agreed that the monitoring staff should include full time technical experts to evaluate data. The need to standardize equipment and terminology was agreed upon by all parties. Standardized training and joint exercises was also well received.

(B) Group II - Alternatives Detection Systems. This group looked at alternatives to portal monitors where portal monitors weren't feasible (ie. Small crossings and infrastructure limited crossings). Several ideas were tossed around but the group came up with three priorities for implementation. 1.) Increased awareness training for customs and border guards. 2.) Development of a list of sources and container types to include visual aids that can be maintained at all posts and easily updated when required. 3.) Deployment of mobile groups consisting of multi-agencies within the country. Coordinate efforts to ensure mobile groups from one country aren't working the same areas as the neighboring country, thus providing a larger coverage area.

(C) Group III - Training, standards and exercises. This group

discussed training programs, the standards utilized by each country, and exercises conducted (both internal and cross border). Training was an easy subject because everyone agrees that training is important and should be standardized as much as possible to include regional training. However, standards were another story. Each country agrees they are committed to enforcing international standards however each country also has its own laws and views of what international standards are. Each country wants to hold on to the "individuality" of its customs system and authority. Cross border cooperation is currently happening at the working level (ports and border forces) but not at the capitol level. All countries stated that they work well with their counterparts across the border and all are committed to enforcing common laws when it comes to illicit trafficking. The consensus on regional exercises was positive with joint training as a favorable by-product.

(D) Group IV - Regional Advisory Council. This topic was not well received at all. All countries stated that they already have regional customs meetings and that don't see any value in this concept. When it was explained to them that the concept was to integrate the "technical experts" with the "enforcement

agencies" they felt this wasn't necessary. Turkmenistan was adamantly against the proposal followed closely by Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were open to discussion but were shut down by very strong personalities of the Turkmen and Kazakh delegates. Bottom line, there will be no regional advisory council.
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